[VOL. XXVII In the earlyand mid lhinies Briıain did not want to be officially bound or in any way committed to the countries of central and soulheastern Europe. The desire not to provoke the displeasure of Germany and lıaly and not to hinder a possible agreement with lhem left its mark on the overall political line pursued by the BriLİsh governmenl during this period. However, the increase in the economie and military potential of Germany and its ever stronger claims for world dominaLİon endangercd the economie, strategie and politieal position of Briıain in lhe Near and Middle East and eve n the very existenee of the British Empire.
The aggressive acts of Germany and ltaly (the oceupation of the rump state of Czechoslovakia, the annexation of Memel and the invasion of Albania) forecd the British government on the eve of lhe Second World War to aeLİvate its policy on the Balkan Peninsula; thus esıablishing lhere eertain strongholds meant to cut off Germany's route to the Mediterranean and lhe British colonial possessions should this prove necessary.
There has not hitherto been any speeial historical investigation exclusively devotcd to the Turco-British relaLİons on lhe eve of the Second World War. Numerous features of these relaLİons have remained obscure waiting for the historian's torchlight to illuminate them. Some works of history dealing with the wider aspccts of international relations in the years between 1936 and 1939 and studies on the foreign policies of Turkeyand Briıain in lhe same period surveyonly separate moments of the relations between the two countries. They examine mainly isolated facets of the foreign policies of lhe grcat powers in lhe Mediterranean and lheir struggle to draw Turkey within one or other of the contesting groups.
Turkish historians have rather tendcd to show greater interest in earlier periods of history, when the Turkish nation played a more crucial role on a world scale. The collecLİve work by a group of prominent Turkish historians, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası: 1919 -1965 Events: ı91 9-ı965),1 reflects standard Turkish historiography on a number of questions pertinent to lhe foreign policy of the eountry and, from this poinl of view, presents considerable interest despite its absenee of footnotes and an index at lhe end. Another reference work for its authoritalive assessments is Montrö ve Savaş Oncesi Yılları: 1935 (Montrcux and Pre-War Years: 1935 ,2 a publication of the Directorate General of Research and Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. Although quite short (only 247 pages), it is very useful for the 1 M. Gönlübol, eLa1., Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası: 1919 -1965 (Turkish Foreign Policy with Events: 1919 -1965 , Ankara, 1969 . 2Montrö ve Savaş Öncesi Yılları: 1935 (Montreux and Pre-War Years: 1935 , Ankara, 1973. many documents printed throughout ilS text. Ataöv 3 , who devoted a few chapters to the foreign policy of Turkey on the eve of the Second World War, lacks in diplomatic detail and documentary evidence. In part, this seems to be the result of Icss than exhaustive use of the available sources.
Vere-Hodge,4 the first among the non-Turkish scholars to address himself to the question of the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey, did so at a time when the best available sources were contemporary newspapers. While the narrative is fairly accurate, he failcd LO analyse the evenlS deeply. Based al most exclusively on British Foreign Office papers, Britain's pre-war rapprochement with Turkeyand the concomitant cooling of Turkey's friendship with the Soviet Union are the subject of Zhivkova's5 somewhat turgid and generally unsuccessful study of Turco-British relations between 1933 and 1939. Her discussion is marred by a rigid Marxist analysis which drives her to view the rivalry of the powers in the pre-war Balkans as a fight for markets a strange argument surely when the British only rcluctantly, and then half-heartedly, accepted the necessity of economic conflict with Germany; and only then from political rather than economic necessity. In fact, it was the Balkan nations themselves which c1amoured for 'exploitation' and the British businessmen who were reluctantly driven to accept the unwelcome necessity; their greatest source of rcluctance being that incursions into the Balkan market might result in exactly the fight for markets which, if Zhivkova's analysis is correct, it was their purpose to wage the Marxist analysis of colonialism, in effect, placed on its head. Evans,6 who wrote later, made scant use of such evidence as there was, and confined his discussion, in the main, LO the period before 1927. Without a driving argument and with no new data to impon, Evans' work provides more of a reasoned summary of the existing literature than an innovative interpretation.
From the legions of memoirs published by Britain's pre-war statesmen, almost none concem themselves directly with Turco-British relations. Eden alone gives the subject any attention.7 From Turkish political Icadership in our period, there is no voice. The diplomatic memoirs of Knatchbul1-Hugessen, Massigli, and Von Papen, although equal1y inlCresting, are of limited use because none of the writers was in Ankara prior 3T. Ataöv, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1939 -1945 , Ankara, 1965 . 4E. Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1918 -1948 , Anne-Masse, 1950 . 5L. Zhivkova, Anglo-Turklsh Relatlons: 1933 , London, 1976 . 6S. Evans, The Slow Rapprochement: Brltaln and Turkey In the age of Kemal Atatürk, London, 1982. 7 A. Eden, The Eden Memolrs: Faclng the Dlctators, London, 1962. to the spring of 1939, and because, with the exception of Von Papen, they are more anecdotal than historical accounts. 8
Few books on discussions of pre-war British diplomacy and strategy address themselves directly to the subject of Turco-British relations. The cIosest we have to an almost complete treatment of Turco-British rclations on the eve of the Second World War is provided by Donald Cameron Watt in How War Came. 9 In the extant historical literature on the period of 1936-1939 the meandering of Turco-British relations during the Montreux Conference on the Straits has been deall with in greatest detaiL. Thus a special section to the Montreux negotiations is devoted in the Survey of International Affairs. lO Butthis publication cannot be adequate because it was wrinen before most of the evidence was available.
The British policy of guarantees and the negotiations for a TurcoAnglo-French treatY for mutual aid have also been the subject of investigations by a number of authors. British historiography endeavours LO present the 'policy of guarantees' as something significant and as a turning point in the policy of Neville Chamberlain's governmenl. These changes in British policyare ratcd as a rejection of the policy of 'appeasement' and as a return to the policy of collective sccurity.ll The myth of some diplomatic revolution, fostered by the British and Western press and by the writings of many authors and politicians has not been altogether discredited to this day.l2 However, one of the best-known authorities on contemporary British history, Alan John Percivale Taylor, is something of a rarity: a British scholar assessing more realistica1ly the policy of guarantees. He writes: 'Here was the turning-point in British policy. It was not meant as such: Chamberlain saw it as a change of emphasis, not a change of direction. The British stili wanted a general seniement with Adolf Hitler, and they put obstacIes in his way so that he would incIine more readily to the agreement.'13 Allhough some British historians criticise single instances in the activity of the Chamberlain's government and express their doubts about 8H. Knatchbull-Hugesscn, Dlplomat In Peaee and War, London, 1949;  R. Massigli, La Turqule devanl la Guerre: MIsslon il Ankara 1939 -1940 , Paris, 1964 F. Von Papen, Memolrs, London, 1952 . 9D. C. Watt. How War Came, London, 1989 of International Affalrs (henceforth referred to as "S.LA."), 1936 , London, 1938 llSee. for instance, E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crlsls, London, 1951 . 12Sec, for example, L. Namier, Diplomatle Prelude: 1938 , London, 1948 13 A. 1. P. Taylor, The Orlglns of the Second World War, London, 1961, pp. 205.206 .
the effectiveness of the guarantees they do not reject the overall trend in British foreign policy.14 Turkey, with ilS advantageous geographical position on the crossroad s between East and West, had for centuries been the cause of fierce diplomatic contests and wars among the great powers. With the intensification of the conflicts bctween the European powers during the i930s and the changes in the international selling af ter Hitler's advent to power, Turkey one e again bccame a focal point wherein the intereslS of the Western democracies were entangled with those of Germany and ltaly. Turkey's important strategic location and the heightencd inleresttowards the possible polilical orientation of the Turkish govemment determined the active policy of the European powers towards iL
The evolution of Turco-British relations in the Iate 1930s cannot be examined in isolation. They must be seen in the context of the whole international configuration bctween the two world wars. The links bctween Turkeyand Britain to a great extent depended on the varying trends in the unfolding of the events in Europe, in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean region. Turkey's policy towards Britaİn and Britain's policy towards Turkey in turn affected and reflected the policy of many other countries. And precisely Turkey was the one country where the connections between Britain's interests in the Balkans and those in the Near East were most evidenl. The investigation of Turco-British relations during the period under scrutiny is most enlightening, as it enables us to outline rather thoroughly the complex international selling crcated in Europe and in the Balkans on the eve of the Second World War.
From a miliıary, strategic and political point of view, Turkey was of exceptional interest to Britain. This characterised the approach of British diplomacy to Turkey, with whose help London hoped to retain ilS positions in the Ncar and Middle East and to seeure ilS supremacy in the eastem part of the Mediterrancan. The StrailS, which had bcen for centuries the natural core of the Turkish strategic importance, did stili retaİn their paramount value for Britain's Mediterranean and colonial concems. The status of the Turkish Straits had never ceased LO be a matter of cardinal interest in the AngloIlaIian, Turco-IlaIian and espccially in the Turco-British relations. During the mid and Iate i930s this question once more loomed large at the centre of Turco-British rclations and to a large degree fashioncd their charaCler.
In dealing with the Strai lS' regime, Britain had never lost sight of ilS military and strategic intereslS. In some cases, this ran contrary to the national intereslS of Turkeyand of the Black Sea states dircctly concerned 14Scc• for examplc. Taylor. The Orlglns;
and Namicr, Diplomatle Prelude.
with the matter. As a Black Sea country, the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to the regime of the Straits. Moreover, the attitude of Britain towards the Straits directly affected Turco-Soviet relations.
The invasion of Ethiopia by Italy in the fall of 1935 marked the beginning of a definitiye closeness in Turco-British relations, which were to undergo a long process of development. This process ran parallel with a gradual carefuııy pha<;ed-out withdrawal of Turkey from the policy of firm cooperation with the Soviet Union. The rapprochement between the two countries in those years enabled Britain to consider Turkey as its safest link in the system of the Balkan countries on the eve of the Second World War.
One of the fundamental factors which during the Iate 1930s always directly moulded the development of Turco-British relations, was the apprehension about the aggressive policy of 1taly. Turkeyand Britain viewed the bellicose and thoughtlessly adventurous policy of Benito Mussolini as a danger threatening both the national interests of Turkeyand the colonial interests of Britain. The Anglo-Italian and Turco-ltalian conflicı<; in the Mediterrancan region facilitated and accelerated the rapprochement between Turkeyand Britain which progressed with particularly quick strides af ter the ltalo-Ethiopian war.
The overall British policy in the Iate 1930s also indisputably Icft its mark on the po1itical line taken by the British government towards Turkey. This in turn directly influenced Turkey's approach to Britain and to a considerable intent conditioned Turkey's part and place in international relations. That is why the question of Britain's policy towards Turkeyand the foreign political orientation of the Turkish government on the eve of the Second World War is indecd complex.
In this paper it is hoped to retrace the successive stages in the development of Turco-British relations during the Iate 1930s and to bring forward the reasons, influences and factors which caused and speeded up the rapprochement between the two countries during that period. The British policy of guarantees and the efforts of Britain to form aBaıkan anti-Hitlerite coalition under its own aegis and this is a question both complicated and controversial will be hereby examined in relation to Turkey's place and part in these plans.
Although the main the me of this survey centres on the period immediately preceding the Second World War, it has also proved necessary to cover some moments from the period af ter the outbrcak of the war in order to reach the signing of the Turco-Anglo-French Tripartite Alliance Treaty of 19 October 1939. In the historical disquisitions on the Turco-British relations during the Iate 1930s, this trcaty is usually given preferential treatment. Both Turkish and British historiographies strive to umayel its fundamental reasons and try to pinpoint the aims pursucd by Britain and France with the signing of the said document in symmetry with the motives of the Turkish govemment to abandon the policy of neutrality and join one of the contesting groups. The importance of such uncovering of the goals of the Turco-AngloFrench treaty far tmnscends the mere cIarilication of the political trends at the root of the policy of Britain and France towards Turkeyand the Balkan countries. It offers a welcome possibility to present a elearer and fuııer picture of the intricate international situation in Europe on the eve of the war. The ıtalian aggression in Ethiopia on 3 üctobcr 1935 gaye Turkey additional rcason to reflect on the sincerity of Mussolini's decIaration in 1934 that 'the historic objectives of Italy are in Asia and Africa' and the fortifications of the island of Leros in the Dodecanese suggested that, when once ltaly had digested its African meal, it might seek fresh morsels to satisfy iL" growing appctite in Asia. Shortly after the commencement of hostilities, the first Turkish charge d'affaires to Ethiopia since 1914 and the first Turkish military attache to this country ever, arrived in Addis Ababa. In addition, a Turkish soldier-of-fortune, Vehip Paşa, was employed by the Ethiopian army as an adviser to its southem forces in a semi-official capacity.16 ün 7 üctober, reacting strongly to new s of the ıtalian invasion, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras told Sir Percy Loraine, the British ambassador at Ankara, that Turkey could be expccted to stand by its aIlies, its obligations and coııective security and would foııow Britain to the last ditch in defence of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Soan af ter the ıtalian attack on Ethiopia the League of Nations Assembly established a coordination committee for the imposition of sanctions. Turkey, with Poland, 15 S.I.A., 1936, pp. 601-602. ı6lbld., 1935, p. 83. Soviet Union, Romania, Spain, Sweden and Yugoslavia represented the most irreconcilable element of what came to be known as the Committee of Eighteen. Turkey, as well, sat on the Co-ordination Committee, a more handy subcommittee of the Eighıeen which acted as its directing body. The Eighteen considered three forms of economic action: a boycott of ıtalian goods, the embargo of essential imports, and the organisation of material support for Ethiopia. Its thoughts moving in the same direction as Britain's planners, on 14 October, the Co-ordination Committee agrecd that member nations would provide support to League states acting in accordance with a League decision under Article 16 if attacked by Italy. Turkey was keen on sanctions and a 'Law for the Careying Out of the Decision Taken by the League of Nations' enabling legislation to permit the application of sanctions was quickly passed through the Grand National Assembly with scarcely any disscnt. 17 Britain approached the Mediterranean powers France, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia with the question as to whether it could depcnd on their support in the event that the imposition of economic sanctions 100 to ltalian attack. Turkey's answer was most encouraging of alL. Af ter consulting his Balkan allies, Aras formaııy advised London, Paris and Rome that Turkey would give immediate and total support to Britain in the event that it was attacked by Italy but would require a reciprocal assurancc. The Turks, he told Locaine privately, understood their obligations under the Covenant in exactly the same way as did Britain. Aras said that in the event of ıtalian aggression Turkey would regard itself as engaged in a military alliance of which it accepts fully the responsibility, dangers and consequences. Loraine thought this answer complete and unconditional acceptance of British thesis.
18
British planning for war against Italy in the Mediterranean continuOO through the winter of [1935] [1936] . Chiefs of Staff Subcomminee of the Committee of Imperial Defence noted the continuing exchange of assurances with the Balkan powers. Turkey continued to out-do the others in its encoumging responsc. it promised to provide anchorage and repair facilities in the Sea of Marmara and to allow Britain to establish a contraband control centre to supervise Straits shipping. Even further, it promised the direct cooperation of the Turkish Navy and Air Force against the Dodccanese. 19 ıtalyangered at the line Turkey was taking, threatened to renounce the Turco-Italian Treaty of Neutrality, Reconciliation and Judicial Settlemenl. Turkish actions were 'inconsistent with the engagements of the Turkish government under the treaty of friendship with ltaly'. Turkey, however, maintained stoutly that it was doing no more than its dutyas a member of the League of NaLİons, and denied that it had any intention of attacking ltaly. Turkey further replicd to the ltalian protest by asking, through Fethi Okyar, its ambassador in London, if it could depend on British nava! support in the event of ıtalian attaek. Britain answercd that 'His Majesty's govemment could be counted upon to do its duty'. It is notable that, while other of the smaIler naLİons bcgan to chaff at sanctions and the dangers they represented, Turkey was insistent that the League and its Covenant must stand as established. Ankara faithfully supported Lcague action against the aggressors. 20
Undeterred by sanctions, ltaly complcted the conquest of Ethiopia by the spring of 1936 and thus made a serious alteration in the Middle EastemAfrican structure. This trend was accentuated by Hitlcr's unilateral violations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, such as the rearmament of Germany announced in March 1935 and the remilitarisation of the Rhineland a year !ater. The European totalitarians were obviously on the move and diplomatic revisionism had given place to military action.
The general situation of Europe having changed politically and militarily, Turkey felt the necd to remilitarise the Straits and thereby revise the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923. The moLİves bchind this fecIing were that the League of Nations had declined in consequence of German rearmament and ıtalian aggression in Ethiopia; Germany had remilitarised the Rhineland and there was no adequate provisions in ıhe Lausanne Treaty guaranteeing Turkish security in case of war. It containcd no provision which permitted Turkey to Lake effecLİve measures in the Straits in the face of an immediate threal. The emergence of ambitious Germany and ltaly had led to an armamenls race which up set the status quo to which ıhe ouı-dated Lausanne Treaty was applicable. ltaly had aıready begun to forLİfy ıhe island of Leros which was so near the [VOL. XXVII
In view of the urgency LO remilitarise the Straits, Turkey could have resorted to unilateral action, but it preferred an agreement through an international conference. Turkish leadership expected a more favourable reply LO a request made in a lawful way, without undermining the League system. Mareaver, Turkey would score amoral success of being the first state to use legal methods for the revision of a post-war treaty. On LO April 1936, Aras, while addressing a mccting of the ruling Republican People's Party, referred to the government's decision to request the Lausanne signatories to meet to discuss the remilitarisation of the Straits. The Turkish note, addressed to the signatories of the Straits Conventian, the Secretary-General of the League and Yugoslavia, pointed at the uncertainty which had gradually arisen in the Mediterranean, the tendency towards rearrnament and the lack of guarantcc for the security of the Straits. 22
With ltaly's exception, the reactions to the Turkish note were favourable. Britain had not only found the Turkish claim fully justified but was alsa in nccd to find new allies in the eastern Mediterranean, where ltaly was challenging its interests. This also offered it an opportunity to pull Turkey away from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Rhineland aıready militarised, the remilitarisation of the Straits could not serve as a precedent for Germany. The British support would alsa eliminate the remote possibility of a dissatisfied Turkey being <iriyen into the political sphere of Germany once again. British government alsa used its good offices in supporting the Turkish case with the French government, urging that it was most desirable on grounds of general principle to give all reasonable encouragement to the procedure, adopted by the Turkish government, of proposing treaty revision by negotiation and agreemenl. Britain feared that Turkey's unilateral militarisatian of the Straits would push it into comman cause with Germany, ltaly and Japan, all outside the orbit of Covenant defenders. The reaction in the London press to the Turkish note was the subject of favourable comment in the Turkish press, which alsa expressed satisfaction at the delicacy shown by Britain in sending a quick reply to the Turkish note, and in stating its readiness to discuss the question immediately, adding that the ties of friendship which were being daily strengthened betwccn Turkeyand Britain would form the most solid basis for the establishment of peace in the Mediterranean. 23
Howard The conference for revision met at Montreux on 22 June. Agreement was reached on the last day 20 July 1936. There were vital differences bctween the Turkish and British theses. Britain, however, was prepared to waive a number of important claims in return for a full understanding with the Turks. At the Montreux Conference, the closest co-opcration was maintained between the Turkish and British delegations. Britain's necd for the Turkish support led to the acceptance of the Turkish draft as the basis of discussion. Britain when the divergence of iı,>claims from those of the Turks bccame clcar upon the submission of the British draft finally showed its Turkish support by agreeing to full Turkish remilitarisation and after some discussion to the total suspcnsion of the International Commission. The British and French surrender over this latter point vital to the pride of the Turks paved the way for a future understanding between the three countries. The final draft approved unanimously was a clear victory for Turkey.24
The signature of the Montreux Straits Convention was the signaI for remarkable manifestations of joy throughout Turkey. The Turkish troops, who reoccupicd the Istanbul and Çanakkale zones during the night of 20 and the morning of 21 July, were greeted with garlands and strcamers, and the Turkish fleet was met by cheering crowds. The signature itself was announced by broadcasts throughout the country, and was celebratcd with flags, illuminations, spceches and torchlight processions. The press was enthusiastic, and spccial tributes were paid to the gentlemanly manner in which British diplomacy had worked in a question of vital importance to Turkey. According to Loraine, Atatürk informed him that he regarded the outcome of the conference as a 'common success' for Turkeyand Britain, and that he rejoiced at the friendly understanding that characteriscd the relations between the two governments. Cordial greetings were exchanged between Aras and his British counterpart, Anthony Eden. 25
The Turkish press, after the successful conclusion of the conference took on a markedly more Anglophile tone; an immediate effect of the improved relations was the giying of several important consignments featuring in the Turkish rearmament and industrialisation plan to British companies, the most notable being the assignment of refortification of the Straits to Messrs. Vickers. Britain began to reshape its polite but non-committal attitude of former years towards the Turks, especially in the field of commercial relations. There had always been difficulties barring any extensive trading between the two countries, but from 1935 onwards an attempt was made by both governments to diminish thesc: a elearing agreement was signed on 2 Septembcr 1936 with the express purpose of increasing the trade volum e and the following year saw an exchange of notes upon the possibilities of further inercasing of inter-trade. This limited trade drive on the part of Britain was mainly political in aim, its object being to relieve the Turks from their growing dependence upon German economy.27
Along with improved trade rclations after Montreux, the decp-rootcd anti-British fecIing that stili prevailed in many influential Turkish circles bcgan to give way to more friendly sentiments. An important stimulus was given to this new phase of Turca-British relations when on 3 Septembcr 1936 King Edward VIII, traveliing as the Duke of Lancaster, arrived off Gökçeada in the steam yacht Nahlin to paya private visit to the Çanakkale Peninsula and to IstanbuL. He was met outside the Straits by two Turkish destroyers, Adatepe and Kocatepe. Escorted by thesc, the yacht procecded to visit the battlefields and cemeteries on the peninsula. The Nahlin arrived in Istanbul in the morning of 4 September. The King, on landing, was grceted by the President, with whom he drove to the British Consulate-General building in Tepebaşy, where he received Atatürk's visit. A return personal visit to Atatürk at the Dolmabahçe Palace was paid by the King later in the day. While in Turkey, the King met most of the leading Turkish statesmen. it was a mark of the importance of this visit for the Turks that his Aide during the visit was General Fahrettin Altay, the general officer commanding the 4th Corps at Gallipoli in 1915 . Altay, in 1936 , was the second most highly rated soldier in the Turkish army. King's visit was an entirely unexpccted honour for the Turkish government; but in spite of this Atatürk received him with great courtesy and the most cordial personal relations were established in the short course of his stay in Turkey. The King remained in Istanbul, 1998, pp. 483-493. Hitherto Britain had stili been considered as a tradiıional foc in Turkey. This visit brought about a psychological change in the mental auitude of the Turkish people towards Britain. The occasion, and the exceptional feeling of inıerest for the person of King Edward which was instantly engendered among the general public, had the effecı of popularising in the space of a few days among all segments of the Turkish population the newly reformed friendship with Britain which ıiıı ıhen had been ıhe affair raıher of governmenlS than of pcoples. And according to ıhe Annual Report of the British Embassy on Turkey for the year 1936, it secmed as though a few hours had sufficed to efface from the Turkish mind, 'in a manner far more reminiscent of the Arabian NighlS Entertainment than of the hard, prosaic realities of the 20th century, the biuer memories of Turco-British hostilities and antagonisms between 1914 and 1923.' Avisit from the British monarch was looked upon as a greaı complimenı particularly as some Briıish writers had erroneously labeııed Aıalürk as a 'dietator' and had of ten mentioned deprecatingly of a President who was regarded by his compatriots in Turkey with the deepest respect and admiration. King's visit, coming as iı did jusı afler the Montreux seulement, carried the Turco-British understanding established al lhe conference table onto a warrner and more personal plane. This visit evoked immense enthusiasm amongsı aıı classes of ıhe Turkish population, and the mulual friendship look a further sıep forward. 29 There was aıendeney in ıhe Turkish public LO give King Edward's visillo Turkey a significance of far-reaching political importance. Whaıever lhe relative point of view mighı be, lhe facı deserved aıtention ıhaı lhe relations between Turkeyand Britain had improved lo the extent nol only of rendering the royal visit possible, but also of making it the opportunity for the manifestaıion of cordial pro-Briıish feelings. Ever since lhe Turkish Republic was founded, personaliıies, crowned and uncrowned, and representative of the nations lo which ıhey bclonged, had come and found in Turkey a weIcome consistent with the best Turkish traditions; bul never had the man-in-ıhe-streeı expressed so much joy mingled with curiosily al seeing the Sovereign of ıhe British Empire. Despiıe lhe requirements of official incognilo, the weIcome offered LO King Edward reaııy was akingiy one. 30 The King's visit was foııowed by a much publicised courtesy call of the Turkish flceııo Malta in Novcmber 1936. In 1929, unilS of lhe Briıish Mediterranean fleet had paid an official visit lo Turkey. This visit had ncver been returned, and the question of ilS return in ı935 had been deferred owing to ıhe Eıhiopian crisis. Early in August ı936, however, the British Admiralty expressed a wish that normal visilS bctween the Briıish and [VOL. XXVII Turkish fieets should be resumed, provided that no visit should be paid by British ships to Turkish ports until the 1929 visit had been returned. The Turkish government, on being approachcd, readily accepted a suggestion that the resumption of visiı') could be usefully and opportunely inaugurated by a visit by the Turkish fieet to Malta, and the date of the visit was duly fixcd for 20-26 Novembcr. The preparations for this visit, and the visit itseif, produced a further demonstration of cordiality. When the visit of the Turkish fieet under the command of Vice-Admiral Şükrü Okan, consisting of the battle cruiser Yavuz, four destroyers, four submarines and a submarine depot-ship, took place as schcdulcd, Admiral Sir Dudley Moore, Commander-in-Chief of the British naval forces in the Mediterrancan, judgcd the event as unqualified success. Atatürk was also picased with the results of the visit. In Ankara, Loraine was having supper in the Ankara Palace Hotel with Aras and Celal Bayar, Minister of Economics, when Atatürk appeared with his entourage. Atatürk rcad to the diners the transcript of Pound's welcoming specch to the Turkish squadron. This was the first visit paid to a foreign country by a Turkish fieet since the war. 31
For the first time since 19 i8 the Turkish fieet steamed through the DardaneHes into the Mediterranean. What was more, the vessels pa id avisit to Malta, the premier British naval base in the Mediterranean. This visit was the culminating event of a long series of moves which had convertcd Turkey from the enemy of the Great War years to a staunch friend of Britain. The change was a notable one, of great importance to the sccurity of both Turkey and Britain.
In Rome, Mussolini was terrifically angry at the visit of the Turkish fieet to Malta especially coming so soon after Edward VLII had pointedly excluded ltaly from his Mediterranean cruise. Hitler also appeared to have bcen annoyed at the growing Turco-British friendship. In January 1937, Aras told Loraine that Hitler had invited the Turkish fieet to make avisit to Kiel as a 'grandiose manifestation of Turco-German friendship'. The Turks ignorcd the offer. 32
In January 1937, Turkey bcgan to endcavour to mend its fences with ltaly. On 3 February, Aras went to visit Count Galeazzo Ciano in Milan. Rcconciliation docs indeed seem to have bccn the Turkish intention. While Turkey welcomed the opportunity of having itself smoother and morc cordial relations with ltaly, and was less apprehensive of a clash with ltaly in view of the progressive strengthening of Turkish armaments, the query marks it put against ulterior ltalian ambitions had not been removed and its attitude remained watchful. Aras' trip to Milan had bccn preceded by a month of the 31 Ibid., 1011/39, Loraine (Ankara) to Oliphant, 24 November 1936. 32Ibid., 282, E264/264/44, Loraine (Ankara) Aras reassurcd ıhe British of Turkish fidelity. He said: 'Now thallhe basic coincidence of Turkey's inlerests with those of Britain was establishcd and the dccision had been taken by the Turkish governmenııo mould iıs local policy in harmony with Britain's world policy, Turkey wa<;rcalising that the possibilities for good, in every way of co-opera ıion with Britain were far !,JTcater even than iı had drearncd them to be'. If there were war, 'Turkey would fight on the side of Briıain'.34 Further, on 6 April, Aras lold Laraine that Turkey was most emphaticaHy not negotiaıing with the ltalians 'but that every nowand the n he discusscd the general situalion in a friendly tone' with them. One of the things, Aras lOld, that he discussed with Ciano, was how to stop lıaly being so disagreeable lO Britain and make an efforl really lo improve Anglo-ltalian relations. Laraine wrole thaı he, himseır, had 'never deıecıed any desire on lhe parı of the Turks lo widen lhe scopc of ıheir friendship wiıh ltaly'.35 Given Ciano's accounl of his discussion wiıh Aras, it seems certain lhaııhe Turks were nol cOnlemplalİng anything more drastic than a mending of bridges. The benevolent attitude of the British government during the Montreux conference helpcd to increase the pro-British feclings in Turkeyand by 1937 a seemingiy well-established Anglophobia and the bogey of 'intrigues of the British intelligence service' almost disappearcd from Turkish minds.38 In the months after Montreux, the Turks had begun to try to convince the British into some formal bilateral arrangemenL Britain, on its part, feared that the Turks might use a British alignment to lead it into connict and commitmcnL An alignment with Turkey, if the Turks chose to make use of it in an unacceptable fashion, might become what London apprehcnded most: an uncongenial commiunent, a possible provocation, and an obstaclc to broader pacifıcation. As Britain moved towards accommodation with Italy, it did not wish to be saddled with any irreconcilable Turkey. Unwilling to pcrmit Turco-British relations LO go further in the direction they had been travelling, but not anxious for them to return from whence they had come, Britain increasingly resorted to informal means to buttress its relationship with Turkey. The Turks, for their part, made an offer of alliance to the British govemment in the latter half of 1936; the latter declincd in the politest of the possible terms stating that the time for alliance did not yet seem to be opportune. British diplomacy was, however, very anxious not to repel Turkish advances and the possibilities of closer understanding were being fully explored by both govemments. 39
It would not be too much to say, indecd, that Britain was on more cordial terms with Turkey than at any period in the history of the two countries, with the result that Turkey now implicitly trusted the word of Britain. A happy symptom of this trust was visible in the choice on 13 November 1936 by the Turkish govemment of the fırm of Sir Alexander Gibb as its consulting engineer and technical adviser. Such advisers existed in a multitude of nations: there were many, in facl, who canvassed their claims for the privilege. But the Turks were resolved that for this extremely responsible post a Briton alone was suitable. As it was, an agreement was reached in record time. Soan Sir Alexander Gibb's representatives were in Turkey, beginning with an improvement of the harbours of IstanbuL. Much work in other parts of Turkey lay bcfore them. So would private British enterprise buttress the official policy of Turca-British friendship. On 2 December 1936, an agreement was concIuded between the Turkish government and the Messrs. Brassert for the construction of the Ereğli iran and steel plant. The whole transactian, involving cIose on three millian pounds, was guarantecd by the British government through the Export Credits Guarantee Departrnent. 40 lt was fortunate for the prospccts of the Turca-British relationship, if not for British foreign policy in general, that Britain's mavement back towards ltaIy, by the summer, was arrestcd and reversed by the reaction of the powers to the outbreak of civil war in Spain on 18 July 1936. In the eastern Mediterranean, the Spanish civil war made little impact until sinkings by unidentified submarines began in August 1937. Most alarming for Turkey, these submarines were operating inside the Straits themselves. This seemed to highlight Turkish vulnerability while raising the possibility of dangerous international complications for a Turkeyonly just restored to full sovereignty over the Straits. 41
The Turkish government lost no time in informing diplomatic missions at Ankara that any submarine found so acting in violation of the Straits Conventian and international law would be captured or, if necessary, destroyed, in the event of it failing to surrender immediately. The continuing acts of piracy committed on merchant shipping by submarines in the Mediterranean led the British and French governments and certain other powers in Septembcr to convene an urgent mceting of Mediterrancan in order to deal with the situation of grave insecurity which had arisen. At the Nyon conference of 14 September 1937, Turkey gaye loyal support to Britain and France in their defence of international shipping against attacks by unknown and most probably ltalian submarines. The signatories, which were Britain, France, Soviet Union, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Egypt, agrced that any submarine which attacked a ship in a manner contrary to the rules of international law referred to in the International Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments signed in London on 25 March 1936 should be counter-attacked and, ifpossible, destroyed. In order to facilitate the putting into force of the above arrangements, the British and 40lbıd. 41S.I.A., 1937-11,p. 342. Freneh fleets were to operate in the Mediterrancan up to the entranee of the D'dfdaneııes. 42
The Turks were responsible for providing bases for patroııing vessels in the Aegean. They were also responsible for patroııing the Turkish territorial waters and the Dardaneııes. From 17 September, the Turks refused port facilities to ıtalian vessels. On 18 September, Numan Menemencioğlu, the Secretary-Oeneral of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, introduced the Nyon Agreement to the Orand National Assembly. The aim of the agreement, he told the deputies, was to prevent a war whieh could only be a catastrophe. He caııed on ıhose 'great powers whieh stiıı remained outside the arrangement to adhere'.43 On 28 September, İnönü announced his resignation 'for reasons of health' from the Premiership. One rumour was that he had opposed Atatürk's policy at Nyon as loo eonfrontational. 44
The antisubmarine patrols were a startling success. Submarine piracy quickly disappeared; noıleası beeause on 14 September Mussolini had ordered a sıop lo sinkings. On 30 September, not linking its position on the outside of something frighteningly like a Mediterranean pact, ltaly adhered to the agreement and took over responsibility for patrols in the Adriatic. 45 Nyon, if nothing else, drove the Turks and British closer together by assoeiating them in what was, in effect, an informal alliance against ltaly. In addition, the proeedure adopted at Nyon of formaııy assoeiating the smaller powers with the aetions of the great had an excellent effect on Turco-British relations. Winston Churchill later wrole that under the 'almost effusively friendly lead of Turkey' the attitude of the smaıı Mediterranean powers had be en satisfactory .46
Turco-British friendship was now a living reality, which by dever diplomaey could be made to extend to countries with whom either Turkish Vol. 14, No. 7, 2 October 1937, p. 45 . it was said that ınönü had counselled a more cautious approach in the maller than was actually followed. How different were the differences between the two men was never reliably confırmed. it is an interesting story. yet one that stilI remains to some extent hidden in Turkish diplomatic archives of the Republican era. Boston, 1948, p. 246. and British relations might hitherto not had been all thatthey might be. This friendship was, indecd, one of the corner-stones in imernational politics, based fırmly on idemhy of intereslS and mutual admiration. il could be made eve n more fmitful than İl now was, standing model as it was of how former enemies might become fa<;tfriends.
The trend of Turkish general policy to incline more and more determinedly towards the closest terms of friendship wİlh Britain was also demonslrated by Turkey's auitude towards Germany. Aras remarked LOEden at Geneva in January 1937 that Turkey must never again make the mislake of finding ilSelf ranged in war on the wrong side, that is, against Britain.47 Atatürk told the British ambassador in Ankara in unequivocal terms his determination that Turkey should never allow itself to be dragged in the political wake of Germany as it had happened before. In the evening of 29 October i937 during the celcbration reception of the fourteenth anniversary of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk had the first imimation of the coming Turco-British agrccment. The British ambassador was the only diplomat invited by Atatürk to sit beside him from eleven o'clock in the evening throughout the night umil ten o'clock next morning, while the German ambassador was only granted a few passing momems. Turkey had experienced a German alliance and it wanted no repetition of thaı 48
In the cconomic sphere, the co-opera tion inaugurated in i936 by the signature of the Brassert contract was continued and in certain respeclS developed. The foundation-slOne of the iron and steel works which Messrs. Brassert was conslrUcting at Karabük had been laid on 3 April 1937. The occasion seemed in the eyes of most, Turks and foreigners alike, to be mainly a demonstration of Turco-British friendship.49
Ever since the days when Sir George Clark was ambassador LOTurkey, Turco-British relations had steadily improved, and, too, from thattime, each country had bccn fortunate in their representatives in the respcetiye capitals. Each ambassador was a man of renown and distinction. A not unimportant part was played in the improvement of Turco-British relations by the British ambassador Loraine at Ankara. of a Icgend.50 Britain's ambassador to Turkey during the Second World War, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, claims in his autobiography that an ability to sit all night through in drinking and card-playing sessions with the head of state was a 'requirement' for holding a diplomatic posting in Turkey.51 lt was a widely held belief widely held, that is to say in the British Foreign Office that the Turco-British rapprochement in the second half of the 1930s had bcen made during Loraine's noctumal tcte-a-tCtes with Atatürk. 52
Knatchbull-Hugessen gives a prominent place to the view that the rcorientation of Turkey towards the policy of rapprochement and friendship with Britain was a personal decision and an individual act of Atatürk. According to the British ambassador, for Ankara's part, this had been a long process of careful deliberation and the decision for closer links with Britain had bcen in tune with the real national interest of Turkey. To that effect the statesmanship of Atatürk was indisputablc. 53
Considering the high degrec of personal involvement by Atatürk in the affairs of his country, the above accounts probably accurately reflect the truth. It was, however, very unusual for the Turkish President to meet foreign representatives on a personal basis and so this may be taken as an indication of the importance he gaye to good relations with Britain. Meanwhile, another sign of Atatürk's early interest in devcloping better relations with Britain was the appointment of his dose friend Fethi Okyar one of the form er Prime Ministers of Turkey as ambassador to London in i934. Okyar was a strong Anglophile who had been to London in ı92 ı, Turkey's distrust of the toıaliıarian states became deepcr during 1938. it was not fond of the policy of the Rome-Berlin Axis; it did not acquit ltaly of designs in the eastern Mediterranean; it was impressed with the grave danger that Germany's advent to the shores, whether of the Black Sea or the Aegcan Sea, would create. The annexation of Austria in March and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in September, and the increased imminence of direct danger which they represented, stiffened Turkey's resolve to do all in its power to co-operate with Britain in adverting the danger and, if the need came, to join Britain in fighting it. There was, naturally, recognition that the balance of armed strength had moved against the British and its Western friends; but there was no sign of Turkey faltering or flinching on that account in its friendship or its policies. During 1938 it became incrcasingly evident that in the event of an armed conflict in Europe Turkish sympathies would be strongly on the side of Britain. A highly important statement was made by Aras at Geneva in September to the Egyptian and Iraqi delegates to the League of Nations Assembly; to them, without in any way pledging his government, he expressed his personal opinion that, if the neutrality of either counlry was violatcd by a power at war with Britain, Turkey would go to the assistance of that counlry. In recounting this to Laraine, ArdS added that he was quite certain that in the circumstances Turkey would take miliıary action; and he believed that it would, if necessary, be able to enlist the armed aid of the other three members of the Balkan Entente. 54
The outstanding event of the year 1938 in Turco-British relations ac; a who le was, without doubt, the signature in London on 27 May of the Guarantee Agrecment and the Armarnents Credit Agreement. By the form er a credit of ten million pounds was granted for the industrial development of Turkeyand by the latter a crcdit of six million pounds, to be expendcd on the purchase of armaments in Britain (3,500,000 pounds for the navy, 1,500,000 pounds for coast defence and one million pounds for aircraft). The effect of these agreements was extremely valuable in the political sphere. The inereasing intimacy of Turco-British relations had made it almost imperative that same signed expression of British interest in Turkey should be forthcoming. At all times Laraine had urged that the most acceptable and useful manifestation of this interest would be in the economic domain; and the Turkish government itself made no secret of its strong desire to receiye assistance in the manner finally arranged. As well as further strengthening the growing friendship between Ankara and London, this loan eliminated the necessity afTurkey depcnding on Germany for over one-half of its trade. 55 The ultimate success of the long and of ten difficult negotiations, which were linked up with further negotiations for a revision of the Trade and Clearing Agreement, was hailcd with the grcatest satisfaction by aLicircIes in Turkey from the President downwards; Aras characterised the agrccments as a striking proof of British friendship and confidence towards Turkey. No matter what happcns, never will we be found in a camp opposing Britain', Aras said to Joseph Levy the Near East correspondent of The New York Times on 21 July 1938. 'Our friendship with Britain is one of confidence and solidarily', he told. Imagine (remarked Aras) here is a country granting us a loan of sixteen million pounds, an important part of which is for armaments, without asking anything in return. Any other country would have demandcd all sorts of privileges in times of peace and particularly in case of war, but Britain asked nothing. it trusted us as it would be a real friend. Britain show ed il had faith in us. We will show it that this faith is not misplaced. The Turks are convinced that siding with Britain at any time means playing safe, Aras went on. 'Britain may lose a battle, but never a war. It has money, a navy and character. When anation possesses thesc three important factors il is always cert.ain of being victorious'.
The passing of Atatürk on 10 November 1938 and the change of Ieadership did not imply an alteration in policy in Turkey. The course established by Atatürk for Turkey was plain and, given existing circumstances, irrevocable; it commended itself to the whole nation, who were ai ike constituents and full supporters. ınönü, the new President, was indeed a true statesman with a most illustrious record of service for his country. it would be correct to say that no Turk understood better the aims of the Iate President than ınönü who was his Premier for some fourteen years. Among those whom ınönü omitted from his government was Aras. But in the existing flow of Turkish life shift of personnel signified little.
The replacement as Foreign Minister of Aras by Şükrü Saraçoğlu betokencd no change in the intimacy of Turco-British relations. A specific assurance that Turkey's foreign policy remained unaltered was given to Loraine on the occasion of his first official interview with Saraçoğlu; the Turkish ambassador in London, upon instructions from the new President, spoke at the Foreign Office in a similar sense, and similar assurances were given spontaneously to Loraine by the new President, on the day af ter his election, in the course of a private audience. 56
Until spring 1939, Turco-British relations remained the story of a Turkish attempt to bring the British to some more formal relationship, and 96/107691-96, No. 545, pp. 128-132 Chamberlain's interest was confined primarily to the great questions Germany, ltaly and Japan but it was inevitable that his activiLies here would have an impact on associated questions. A question strongly inOuenced by Chamberlain's great policies was the develaping Turca-British relationship. For Chamberlain, the question of Turkey was entirely associated and subordinate LO those of Germany and ltaly, and the question of ltaly, ancillary LO that of Germany. He did not think dccply about Turkey but accepted the judgement of the professionals as a lawyer docs his brief. The Foreign Office convinced him that Turca-British relations were important; but the mililary authoriLies persuaded him LO an eve n greater exlent that the ltalians would resent anything too formalar too close and insisted that the threat from Germany would not permit Britain to divert any resources to account for possible ıtalian hostiliLy. For Chamberlain, no benefit to be gained from Turkey would off-set ltalian hosıiliLy. He could support no initiative likely LO hamper the appcasement of ıtalyand was convinced that an alliance wiLh Turkey would constitute such an initiative. 58
ILwas prcciscly in his Mcdilerranean policy that Chamberlain clashed with Eden. The lalter had never accepted the view of the military auıhorities that ltaly was a crucial factor; nar did he accept their cantention that the appeasement of ILaly and alliance with Turkey were incompatible. Eden continued to direct Britain's regional policy, the implications for TurcaBritish relations were obvious. if Britain accepted the risk of conOict wiLh ltaly il would have to develop ilS political relations in the Mediterranean accordingly. Polential allies, as followed from British war planning for the Meditcrranean, would bccome important. 1931 -1938 , New York, 1986 imporıant potential regional ally. In effect, through the acceptance of possible confronıation with lıaly, Eden's policy pointed towards alignment with Turkey, and through sanctions, Montreux and Nyon, relucıantly, and with many second thoughts, this was the path Briıain had followed. The Turks were zealous supporters of this mavement. In most respects their analysis of the Mediterranean situation was identical with Eden's.59
Eden's Near Eastem policy, which tended towards claser relations with the Turks, was side tracked by his resignation. Thereafter, it was not that Turca-British relations bccame less friendly, but that they ceased maving towards the greater and more farrnal relationship which had seemed ineviıable. In Turkey Eden had always been pcrceived as an ally, and most Icading Turks very much preferred his policy to Chamberlain's. Aras had worked closely wiıh Eden in Geneva and counted him a personal friend. In Ankara, there were many who saw in Eden's resignation a sign that the policy of London was 'to try to placate its enemies by abandaning its friends'; a turning from the League of Nations to Rame; worse, an indication that Britain was secking an exclusive accommodation wiıh the ltalians. 60
The 1937-1938 changes, then, brought to power in London men particularly disinclined to ıake the initiative in the Mediterranean. If the development of Turca-British relations seemed to have sıalled af ter Nyon, changes in the govemment of Briıain was one of the reasons this was so. Turkey, meanwhile, continued to pursuc an alliance with Briıain as amalter of fixed policyand this remained the case before, during and af ter the changes in Icadership both in Turkeyand Britain indicated above.
The German occupation of Prague on 15 March 1939 and the subsequent apparent threat to Romania marked the sudden switeh in Briıain from a policy of appcasement of dissatisfied powers to one of containment of aggressors. The shift in Mediterranean strategy resulted as much from a change in personncı at the Admiralty House in October ı938 as from altered international conditions during the spring of the following year. In their 'European Appreeiation: 1939 -1940 ' of 26 January 1939, the Chiefs of Staff Subeammince of the Committee of Impcrial Defence had judged that the best policy in a war wiıh Iıaly would be to ıake ruıhless and immediate action against this country's position in the Mediterranean. It was decided that whatever circumstances surrounded the outbreak of such a war, the best policy remained to direct a knock out blow against Italy at the outset while remaining on the defensive against Germany. The best course, it was thought, was to apply 'maximum pressure on the weakest part of our 59lbld. 60F.O. 371/954/28, Loraine (Ankara) to Eden, 17 Fcbruary 1938 . And Ibld., 1011 /65, Eden to Halifax, 23 February 1938 enemies front, and that, in so far as wc can judge in peace, that part seems likely to be ltaly,.61
Moreover, in a massive report signed by ıhe three British Chiefs of Staff on 20 February 1939, a rapprochement wİlh Turkey was made avital recommendaLİon. They auached the highest importance to the military advantages lO be derived from having Turkey as a British ally, in a war against Germany and ltaly. This advice was central lOAnglo-French strategy. The defence of the Mcditerrancan had becn divided equally between the British and French navies; the former being responsible for lhe eastcm half, the lauer for the westem end. A German penetraLİon of the Balkan countries would have been a deadly ıhreatlo the British naval prescnce in the Adriatic, Aegean and easlem Mediterranean.
An alliance with Ankara could interrupt completely Halian trade wiıh the Black Sea by closing the Straits. The harbour at ızmir would be uscful for opcraLİons againsı the Dodccanese. 'For these reasons it is difficult to overemphasise the influence which Turkish intervention on our si de would have on the position in the easlem Mediterranean and the Aegean', the British Chiefs of Staff had wriuen. 62
Here was a priceless ally whose association wİlh Britain was urgently requested as the comerslone of Mediterranean policy. The Foreign Office recognised this and described Turkey as a 'Smail Great Power'. Its policies would benevolenıly influence those of ıhe other Balkan countries and, as a Moslem country, boisıer Britain's influence in iıs numerous Moslcm colonies. 63
The French readily agreed wiıh the British on the value of Turkey as an ally in a war against ltaly. Such an alliance would strengthen the French posilion in Syria and would facilitaıe the capturc of ltalian posscssions in the Dodecanese and so eliminaıe thaı threat lo the allied naval position in the Aegean. Turkish harbours and air bases could be used by the allied forces to powerfully reinforce their dominance of the eastem Mediterrancan. Alone among the armies of the Balkan countries, the Turkish army had the unquestioning respect of the Military Staffs of the European great powers. The Turkish armcd forces had been in a state of semi-mobilisation for some time. Since the Bulgarians had been granted increased armaments in an agrecment with the powers of the Balkan Entente signed at Salonika in August 1938 as part of a move to defuse Bulgarian revisionism, the Turkish army had felt discretion to be the better part of valour. In Deccmber 1938 the Turkish high command had strengthened the garrisons of the frontier fortifıcations in Thrace by the creation of a new army corps. Anxietİes about the vulnerability of the Anatolian coast-line to amphibious attack from the ıtalian bases in the Dodecanese, had caused asimilar strengthening of those forces based in Izmir. 65
The British government's approach to Ankara subsequent to the German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia had elicited the reply that it was for Britain and France to make elear fırst what action they intended to lake before requestİng assistance. The Turkish government, in addition, was reluctant to promise adherence to any eastem combination not ineluding the Soviet Union for the simple reason that it could not conceive how it could work. It indicated, however, that Britain itself could count on Turkish support in all cases except where Britain was attacked in the West but not in the Mediterranean. 66 This meant, in effect, that Britain could rely on Turkey's help in a war with ltaly. Turkey's attitude towards the German problem, however, remained contingent upon the Russian position. Failing strong British guarantees, the most that Turkey would promise against Germany was consultatİon. 67
On 21 March, Aras, the Turkish ambassador in London sought out, Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary to state officially and unequivocaııy that his country was prepared to go to all lengths with Britain in the Mediterranean and that this decision was a fıxed policy decided on before he lcft Turkey. Aras said that the situation was that the Turkish government was quite satisfıed with all its existing treaty arrangements, and quite determined to fulfil all its obligations under them. He went on: 'But before accepting any further commitments and before departing from neutrality, the Turkish government wish to be reassured on two points. The first was, generaııy, would they have Britain with them? And the second was, more particularly, would they have benefit of direct British assistance? At present, in certain eventualities the~would only depart from neutrality if they were on the same side as Britain. '6 In Ankara, on 26 March, Saraçogıu gaye Knatchbull-Hugessen a fairly clear message. Given a satisfactory political agreement, sufficient aid, and staff talks, Turkey would partner Britain in the eastem Meditermnean at least against Italy. Against Germany, some accommodation with the Soviet Union, was a near prerequisite, and the Turkish attitude less than straightforward in the absence of one. 69
By the end of March, Germany had annexed Memel and the European powers fclt they were facing a project of limitless German expansion. Also in March, Franco had dealt a decisive blow to Republican Spain by entering Madrid in triumph. Nationalist Spain, indulging in an expansionist propaganda campaign, was demanding Gibraltar and French North African territories, foreboding ill for Britain and France.
As no encouragement seemed to be coming from cİlher London or Paris where it had been decided on 21-22 March to give priority to an armngement with Poland and Romania, leaving the larger question of Turkey, Greece and the Balkan Entente to alater time, Aras on the last day of March presented himself once more at the Foreign Office, this time to develop two ideas he stated as his own and which he gaye to Halifax unofficially, although it is not difficult to guess with what official trepidation Ankara awaited their reception. Aras suggested a treaty of non-aggression among Poland, Romania, Russia and Turkey with all parties agrccing to combine against any party contravening it, the whole arrangement to be backed by a British guarantcc. Regarding the Mediterranean, he asked whether other countries, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece, could accede to the Anglo-ltalian arrangement of 16 April 1938 for the preservation of the status quo, and implied that they would be ready to do so; and if Franco-Italian relations improved, France, too might eventually join. 70
It was a far-reaching proposal designed to stabilise relations amongst the powers most interested in resisting German aggression, obviously the fırst step towards an effectiye containment front. Halifax failed to understand boıh its importance and ıhe logic behind it. He asked how an undertaking by those countries not to attack each oıher would really strengıhen the common front against Gennan aggression. Aras gaye him the obvious answer: it would dispel their mutual suspicions. AfLer all, since this was the central difficulıy in the way of Polish-RomanianSoviet co-operaıion, it would prevent the possibiliıy of a Nazi-Soviet agreement lo crush Poland and Romania and then lum on the resl of Europe. These explanaıions did noı make Halifax more enthusiasıic. Aras wenl further. He drew aııention to the fact that under the spccial protocol of 1929 attached to the Turco-Soviet Treaıy of Neutrality and Non-aggression ncüher parıy was at liberty lo make an arrangemenl wiıh a neighbour of the other party without lhe lalter's consent. Consequently, if there was any idea of fonning a block wiıh Turkey or Romania (or Poland) this could only be done with Soviet consent and it was, therefore, imperaıive that Soviet-Romanian relaıions and Soviet-Polish relaıions be pul on lhe best possible fooıing immediately so thaı Russia might not wish to bar any treaıy relalions between Turkeyand those two countries. This was, of course, precisely the position Turkey found itself in when, af ter Britain and France exıended a guaranıee to Poland and Romania, they sought lo make it operalive by enlisting Russian help.72 it may be argued thaı Aras' proposals were overtaken by events. More likely ıhey were dismissed. The Foreign Office surrendered to events espccially where Polish-Romanian relalions wiıh the Soviet Union were concerned. At lhe end of March a proposal for a rcciprocal guarantee to Poland and a non-reciprocal guarantce to Romania (dependenı on those lwo countries making their treaty arrangements operative againsı German aggression) had been laid before those govemments while no step was taken to involve the Sovieı Union or Turkey. The weakness of the proposal was exposed within day s when the Polish and Romanian govemments acquainted London with their unwillingness to co-operate against Gennany. And when, a few days later, ltaly's aggression against Albania seemed to pose a ıhrcat to 71lbld. 72lbld.
Grecce the roles were reversed and Britain found ilSelf placing before Turkey the same consideraLion that Aras had put to Halifax.?3 On 7 April, not entirely happy with the policy of the British government, yet unable to constnıct a better, Grigore Gafencu, the Romanian Foreign Minister and currently President of the Permanent Council of the Balkan Entente and Saraçoğlu, meeting in Istanbul, decided to folIow a common line with the Western powers aimed at containing German aggression. 74 On the same day, as Saraçoğlu and Gafencu deliberated in Istanbul, ltaly invaded Albania. Mussolini's occupation of Albania causcd great concem in London regarding the possible continuation of ltalian expansion in the direction of the Balkans and the Near Eası The Whitehall considered that the moves of ıtalyand Germany had been c10seIy orchestrated and that the Axis had far-rcaching aims. For the first time since Nyon, ltaly appeared unequivocalIy among Britain's possible enemies. In Turkey, the invasion marked the return of ltaly to fırst place in Turkey's demonology. In Turkey, as in ltaly and France, it was axiomatic that an ıtalian invasion of Albania would be only the spearhead of a general Balkan advance.7 5
Turkey's Ieaders reacted to the ltalian invasion of Albania by calIing three classes back to the colours, approving a new credit of 215 milIion Turkish liras and rccalIing various specialist troops to give them in all 250,000 men under arrns; of these, the bulk, 100,000 or so, were in Thrace, 50,000 or so were in westem Anatalia and the remainder scattered through the country. German military reports put eight infantry and one cavaIry division in Thrace with steady reinforcement through the spring and summer. Whoever else was to be caught out, it was not to be the Turkish high command, which eyed the steady building up of ıtalian forces in Albania (some twenty Italian divisions were widely reported there) with the deepest suspicion. 7 6 it is worth recording that developmenlS culminating in the ltalian action in Albania had caused all Turkish newspapers to publish Icading articles which reOected one comman patriotic thought, and, in energetic, but measured terms, expressed a stubborn determination to preserve Atatürk's legacy. The following extraclS would give an idea of Turkish public opinion: 'Of course, Turkey is neither a Czechoslovakia, nar an Ethiopia, nar an Albania. Everybody knows il. Recent history has shown how, deprived of everything, betrayed by ilS governmenl, saId by its Sovereign, wilhout arms or ammunition, the Turkish nation has been able to throw ilS adversary into the sea. The men who lcd our peoplc through the se great trials are still with us. Certainly we have lost an incomparabIe genius, but we stili have his closest lieutenanlS, his companions in arms who watch over his \cgacy.'77 In the Tan, Zekeriya Sertel rccommended the forming of a Balkan confederation, and af ter describing the situation of Romania and Yugoslavia with regard to Germany and ltaly, the ltalian threat over Grccce, as well as the Germanoltalian propaganda in Bulgaria, stressed the implied threat against all Balkan countries.7 8 'When spcaking of Turkey, our ltalian friends should change the ir tane. We, Turks, are for peace in the country, pcace in the world. We are neutral not bccause we lend our ears to ltalian threalS or bccause we are reduced to rely on anyone's assurance or guarantee. We relyonlyon one guarantec, the guarantce which is given us by the Turkish army.'79
In Ankara, Refik Saydam, the new Prime Minister, made a statement of foreign policy in the Grand National Assembly on ıi ApriI. Saydam said that Turkey was watehing the development of the international situation with great auention and conccm. Though it had only friendly feclings towards all eountries, great and smail, and intended to remain faithful to its commitments, Turkey would not fail to safeguard ilSelf to ils utmost eapaeity against any danger, direct or indireel. Thanks to its mighty armed farees, Turkey was fully prepared to repulse any attaek. He eontinued: 'In these times, when idcas and intereslS eonOiet with such violenee, no ideology or passian of intereslS wiII make Turkey deviate from the path of peace. No aet eapable of imperilling the life or well-being of the Turkish nation will eome first from your government, unless our good will, our sincere and friendly neutrality towards all states, should be directly or indirectly the object of an auempt at violation.' The Prime Minister emphasised that Turkey had given proof of ilS vigilanee by taking measures against events which the Turkish nation might possibly have to faee. He went on: 'Baeked by ilS strong, intrepid army, Turkey remains vigilant in face of the present world crisis, which raises nation against nation, bringing about the disappearanee of states within a few days. Faced with an international 77Ahmet Ağaoğlu, tkdam. The initial reaclions of Lord Halifax to the ıtalian attack on Albania struck Saraçoğlu as hesitant and lacking in firmness. For a moment Saraçoğlu was baffled and discouragcd, and his first reactions to lhe news of lhe British guarantees to Romania and Greece and the British proposal that Turkey should extend its aIIiance with Grcece to cover attack from ltaly were cold and on the sniffy side. Bluntly Saraçoğlu remarkcd to Sir Hugh lhat his govemment was not preparcd lo put ilSelf irretrievably on the side of Britain without some definite British guarantee of Turkey's own security.B1 No doubt he was lhinking of the ıtalian naval and air bases in the islands of lhe Dodecanese, a barrier across lhe entry to lhe Aegcan, and only minules' flying time away from the cities of Turkey's Aegean coast-line. 82
The position, however, was immediately altered by the British decision to guarantee Romania without wailing to straighten out the PolishRomanian relationship. On 12 April lhe Turks were belatedly offered the treaty of mutual assistance lhey themselves had proposed lhree wecks before. 83 it was now up to the Turkish govemment to examine the tardy British offer in the light of lheir own security requirements and the developmenlS of lhe last few weeks. The Turkish reply was retumed on 15 ApriI. Turks were not prepared to come to the aid of Romania with their military forees, which lhey anlicipatcd would be fully engaged in the defence of the DardaneHes. They insisted on Soviet co-operation. They emphasised lhe importance of auempting to seule Romania's difficulties with Bulgaria. But in lhe event of war in the Mcditerranean, and on these terms, Turkey would fight on Britain's side. B4 Although highly circumscribed, it was an encouraging answer and negotiations during lhe next two weeks proceeded along normal diplomatic lines with both sides showing goodwill necessary to bring them to a successful and early conclusion. On 23 April Saraçoğlu had spoken of a treaty of alliance lasting fifteen years, and wilhin lhe week the British had suggested four steps in the negotialions lhe issue of a joint declaration stating the two governments' intention to arriye at a pcrmanent treaty of mutual assistancc and providing for reciprocal help in the intcrim period; discussions to settle the political, financial and military clauses; and, finaııy, the conclusion of the definite trcaty.85
Lord Halifax explained that he thought the Germans were feeling around to create apprehension wherever they could, and that when they found a weak place they would exploit iL Hence the importance he attached to a rapid and public strengthening of the ties of solidarity between aıı the states that fell themselves threatened. 86 This was, very broadly, the Turkish view, but the Turks drew a considerable practical distinction between Germany and ltaly, based on the limilS of their own effective action. What they hoped for was a triangular struclUre of agreements, between Britain and the Soviet Union, between themselves and the Soviet Union and between themselves and Britain. To the first of these they attached immense importance but had little practical to offer. The second they envisaged as covering the Balkans and the Black Sca only. The third feıı into two parts: against ltaly, automatic co-opcration in the event of war in the Mediterrancan; against Germany, cooperation only if war sprcad to the Balkans. 87 This division was explained by reference to the Soviet Union. it was picked up by Lord Halifax and incorpomted in the British draft of the declaration.
By 6 May, the Turkish and British govemmenlS had decided upon a draft of amutual assistance declaration and the French were informed of ilS existence. The French approved of the draft and suggested that it become tripartite, but by that time it was aıready clear that Turkey regarded the French attitude over the Hatay question as completely unsatisfactory. The Turks refused to announce the declaration in triple form until a definite agreement on Hatay had been reached. On 9 May, the British informed the French that they held it very essential that the French make a declaration corresponding to theirs with Turkeyand they offered to postpone the announcement of their agreement while the final arrangemenlS about Hatay were made. 88
The Frcnch fclt unable LO conccde Hatay at that moment. The British were impatient with this reply and increased the pressurc on France by claiming that Franz Von Papcn, the new German ambassador, might dissuade the Turks from thcir friendly attitude at any time. Gennans in particular, it was important that, in any general war that might break out in Europe, Turkey should remain neutral and the Straits closed against the fleets of the Western powers. On the eve of war in 1939, therefore, they were at pains to prevent Turkey joining one of the diplomatic combinations their principal opponents, Britain, France and Russia, were endeavouring to raise against them. As Von Papen put it, on the occasion of his appointment in April 1939, in the event of war the Turks must be persuaded to adopt 'the strictest neutrality' and 'close the Straits to everyone '.89 In the meantime, the arrival in Ankara of the new ambassador of the Reich, Von Papen, had drawn increased attention to Turco-Gennan relations. For several years pa st it had bccn possible for the average Turk to hannonise his sentiments with the official Turkish political credo in all circumstances strictly to follow an essentially Turkish policyand, to that end, not to concem itself with any foreign state system. Recent developments, however, had stirred public opinion and caused the press to lake a stand in matters which, it was now felt, might happen to be of direct Turkish interest. With the exception of a very smail, but largely circulated, section of the Turkish press, unquestioncd preference was now given to the Western democracies, despite a traditional and deeply-rootcd consideration for Gennan ability and efficiency, and it should be added, despite what appeared to be a wellorganised and well-planned pro-Gennan propaganda. That propaganda was partly based on Turco-Gennan economic bonds, and particularly on the opportunities of easy profit offered to merchants and intennediaries doing business with Gennany. It did not, however, escapc the attention of a great number of people that Turkish dependence on Gennan economics, although of immediate advantage, might in the long run prove unfavourable to Turkey's real interests, and surprise was frequently expressed at British delay in enabling Turkey to export its goods to other countries than Gennany. Such assistance, it was said, should be independent of loans, and rather aim, through some subsidised organs, at making it possible for the Turkish importer or exporter to do business with Britain without affecling the existing Turkish price leveı. 90
On the other hand, the Turco-British negotiations were moving to their conclusion. The British dramatically postponed the announcement of their agreement with Turkey an hour at a time to further increase the pressure on France in hopes that it would join them. Nonetheless, the French refused to comc to tenns and on ıı May, while the negotiations were in the midst of 89D.G.F.P., D.V., no. 288, 23 April 1939. 90uıus, Speclal Issue, 1 April 1939. This special number was devoted to Britain, in which Turco-British friendship was emphasised. The purpose of the special number was largely to thank Britain for the interest it had taken in Turkish affairs.
their difficulties, Britain and Turkey signed a declaration of mutual cooperation and assistance whose anicles could be briefly outlined as foııows:
1. Subscquent conclusion of a long-term reciprocal defence treaty; 2. Mutual guarantees. Pending the completion of the definitive treaty, Turkish and British goveroments declare that in the event of an act of aggression Icading to war in the Mediterranean area, they would be prepared to co-operate effectively and to lend each other aıı aid and assistance in their power;
3. The guarantee would not be directed against any country and was defensive in nature; 4. Additional and more definite ta1ks were to procecd; 5. Turkeyand Britain would consult on how to ensure the stability of the Balkans;
6. The freedom of either signatory to enter other agrrements. 91
The French regrettcd that the Hatay question should have prevented the Turco-British agreement from becoming a tripartite accord with their participation.The
French had given their cogratulations wholeheartedly, though they were naturaııy disappointed that some last-minute points of detail obstructed their announcing asimilar dcclaration with Turkey at the same hour. 92
For Lord Halifax and his advisers, the declaration itself, even the alliance, was important mainly for the anchor it would provide for the security line they were attempting to call into existence in southcastem Europe. The role of the Turks was to boIster and buttress Romania, and through Romania, Poland. Turkey was to persuade its partners in the Balkan Entente to damp down the conflict with Bulgaria, so far as was possible, within the bloc. The extent of the dcclaration as laid dow n was the widest commitment Britain had yet made in its effort to bui Id up a European aııiance against Axis agrression. If the Axis powers started anything in either the Meditermnean or the Black Sea, Turkeyand Britain were in it together. if Turkish interests were affccted by any action laken by the Axis powers in the Balkans, Britain was in it. And if Britain became involved anywhere in the Mediterranean arca or the Balkans -either because of its Mediterranean interests or because of its new guaranlees to Greece and Romania-Turkey would come to its aid with every militaey force it possessed. In other words, it was a complete agreement on Turco-British cooperation against Axis aggression anywhere cast of ltaly. In the Grand National Assembly, hefore reading the artieles of the declaration, Premier Saydam spoke as foIlows:
You know political events have occurred lately with lighıning speed and have seriously occupied the aııention of those burdened with the responsibilities of govemmen!. At first this government deeided Turkey's best course was to remain neulral but when events involved the Balkan peninsula and raised the question of seeurity in the eastem Mediterranean, we were forecd with a situation pregnant with danger whieh made it impossible fo us to remain neutral. it is our eonviction that the Mediterranean should be free to all nations on a footing of equality, and any altempt to interfere with that freedom would endanger Turkish seeurity. Believing this danger now exists, we have made up our minds to eo-opcrate and, if necessary, to fight with those equally anxious to preserve pcaee. 94
After reading the declaration, Saydam went to great lenghts to explain the reasons for his country's abandonment of neutrality. It was avital Turkish interest, he stated, that all the countries in the Mediterranean should have free exercise of their rights without any encouragement being given to the idea of hegemony. Now that trouble had extended to the Mediterranean and Balkans, to remain neutral would jeopardise Turkey's security. The best way to avoid war was for Turkey to associate with those countries which were invited together for peace but not shrinking from war if necessary. The Prime Minister stressed that the declaration was aimed at no one country but also that Turkeyand Britain would oppose by force any threat to their rights and interests. For that reason he was asking the Grand National assembly to approve association of Turkeyand Britain in defence of pcace and securityan assoeiation nourishing no aims of encirelement but designcd rather to ward off catastrophe of war. Saydam expressed conviction that dcclaration, together with subsequent agreements foreshadowed in it, would help notably to weigh down the scales on the side of peace. Policy of Turkeyand its aIly was to keep peace and to attack the rights of no one. In pursuit of peace Turkish govemment would continue to exert every effort. He added that negotiations were going on with France and that his country was keeping in elose touch with the Soviet Union, with which country there was a complete identity of views. Lastly, as an amplification of ArticIes 5 and 6 of the deelaration, he registered the hope that the Balkan Entente might be further enlarged and fulfil a stili more useful function. 95
Fethi Okyar, Minister of Justice and the former ambassador in London, supporting a motion in favour of the deelaration, said Turkey entertained good relations with all nations and had been developing its 94Anatollan
News Agency, 13 May 1939. 95lbld.
national resources, when a cataelysm had shaleen the foundations of pcace and sccurity. Czechoslovakia had becn wipcd of the map in 24 hours, he rccalled; Romania had been the object of a veiled ultimatum and Albania had lost its independence at the hands of 'a great power' which aıready possessed islands elose to Turkish shores and had concentrated there troops and war materials. Treaties and solemn pledges had becn violated, he continued, and as a consequence an atmosphere of fcar and insecurity had becn created. The Turks want peace and threatened no one, he added, but others were threatening. Turkey's forees, combined with those of Britain, he went on, would, however, be able to repulse any danger, and in a ho ur of necd the Turkish nation, inspired by the spirit of the Iate President Atatürk, would again display the same heroism as in the pası 96
The Turkish press of 14 May commented very favourably on the Turco-British Declaration and printed extracts from artieles published about it in British, French, German and ıtalian newspapers. Cumhuriyet said that Turkey was not an artificial country created by diplomats at a round-table conference; its great history did not allow it to accept the theory that nations must be defeated and the masters enslaved. Akşam wrote that Turkey's position was elear. it could not accept the 'Iiving room' argument with which some great powers eloaleed their expansionist ambitions; stiıı less could it admit that the Balkans be used to satisfy such ambitions. Tan hoped thatthis deelaration, the sole object of which was the preservation of peace, freedom and security in the Mediterranean, will be foııowed by others conceived in the same spiril. Son Posta said that if a country like Turkey, which had steadfastly worked for peace, found it advisable to join forces with the democracies, it meant that it was convinced that peace was seriously endangered and that the assistance of aıı was necessary to join forces with the democracies to sav e il. Yeni Sabah stated that none could reasonably accuse Turkey of aggressive intentions towards Germany and ltaly. The stand which it had taken could, therefore, be attributed only to the fear of aggression from those countries. if this fear was groundless so much the bener and the totalitarian states, instead of taking umbrage, could by their actions very easily dispel il. The semi-official Ulus, under the headline, 'Historic Dccision', wrote that the Turkish and British nations had undertaken new duties and responsibilities for a noble ideal, the maintenance of peace; the friendship and esteem which they had for one another would help towards its achievemenl On 30 June, the Grand National Assembly ratified the deelaration. On this occasion, Saraçoğlu spoke. The declaration, he told the Assembly, was 96lbld. the last step in Turkey's reconstruction and the last logical step in a chain of events beginning with Ethiopia and incIuding Montreux and Nyon. 97 In the House of Commons, Premier Chamberlain announced that the declaration was not directed against any country but was designed to assure Turkeyand Britain of mutual aid and assistance if the necessity should unhappily arise. Each country was in need of the other and each brought important political and strategical contributions to the common defensiye fund. Chamberlain statcd that the Anglo-Turkish arrangement did not preclude either govemment 'from making agreements with other countries in the general interest of the consolidation of peace'. The form of French association was to remain for decision by Turkeyand France. 98
The British government was widcly praised for the decIaration. 'Unreservedly and unequivocaııy', David L10yd George said, 'I congratulate them upon the Turkish agrecment. it is of great vaule'. But the guarantee, he wamed, would not be sufficient to ensure safety from the dictators unles accompanied by increac;ed armaments and a Soviet aııiance. The real solution was not Turkey instead of Russia, he said, but Turkeyand Russia. 99
Winston Churchiıı, too, applauded the declaration. The news of the Turkish guarantee, he said, were 'rare and fresh fmit, the more refreshing because perhaps, unhappily, theyare somewhat rare'. He, like L10yd George, hoped that the aııiance might be a signpost on the road to agreement with Russia, because, he reminded the House, in the Balkans, Britain and Russia had a virtual identity of interesı 100
Archibald SincIair, for the Labour Party, warned that the declaration would not likely be operative without a corresponding Soviet agrecmenı 'Do not let anyon c supposc', he warned, 'that if any one of the countries in the Mediterranean area which wc have guarantecd were the object of aggression next week, that Turkey would necessarily move aman, a ship, or a gun.
Turkey would not move unless and until [... l the cooperation of Russia were assured'.101
Lloyd George and Churchill were correcl The fact that the guarantees had gone forward without any reference to the Soviet Union was an extravagant slight which Moscow did not soon forget and, in Turkish eyes, constituted a flaw which in isolation might have proved sufficient to depriye 97lbld. 1 July 1939. 98Hansard, Commons, Vol. CCXLVII, Col. 1814 . 12 May 1939 . 99Ibid., 19 May 1939 . IOOlbld. 101 Ibld., col 1872 , 19 May 1939 the guarantce of most of its value. The fears of WhitchallOs critics were shared by the military authorities who tendcd, like Lloyd George and Churchill, to see a Soviet conncetion as the logical next step following from an alliance with Turkey.I02
The declaration and the prospect of a long-term treaty had been grected, rightly, with the utmost enthusiasm by the Turkish and British nations. But it had no appearance of a panic measure. Long ago the sceds of Turco-British friendship were sown. One should not speak of the historic connections between the Sublime Porte and London, for they were severed -it might have becn thought irrevocably severed-by the Great War and its unfortunate aftcrmath, when the Greeks were sent to invade Anatolia. Rather, one should think of the patient and convicing efforts of succcssive British ambassadors in Turkey, of Sir Ronald Lindsay, of Sir George Clark, of Sir Percy Loraine, and of Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, during whose terms of office this consummation had been reached. Through the untiring effort of these men, whose activities were mached by those of far-seeing men of the Turkish side, among whom, without invidiousness, might be mentioned Atatürk, İnönü, Aras and Okyar. Such men as these it was who saw the true interests of their respective peoples, and they might rightly be regarded as the chief architccts of this imposing pi1lar of peace.
Yet, despite the visible growth of Turco-British understanding and friendship, Turkey undoubtedly would have preferred to remain neutral, had neutrality bcen possible. Pcace was dictated by its internal necessities, and nothing could more gravely impair its programme of reform than rencwed preoccupation in war. But the force of circumstances had rendered neutrality impossible. The average Turk thought that the danger to his country was greater from ltaly than from Germany, for he had never accepted at their face value the protcstations of friendship from Rome. But he fully realised that in the Mediterranean ltaly would never move alone, and that the weight of the great power on the north of the Balkan Peninsula might in emergency attempt to make itself felt against the shores of Asia.
The dcelaration was rceeived in the West with predictable jubilation. Out of the improvisations of March and April, when Poland, Romania and Greece had been extended hasty guarantees, an embryonic conlainment front was now beginning to lake shape which, it was hoped, would eventually link Britain and France with the Balkan Entente and Russia. Its linchpin was Turkey. 103
I02See i. Maisky, Memorls or a Soviet Ambassador, London, 1967 , passim. I03F. Marzari, 'Westem-Soviet Rivalry in Turkey: 1939 -1', Mlddle Eastern Studies, Vol. 7, No. I, 1971 .
General ıtalian opinion was especiaııy perturbed by the adhesion of Turkey to the anti-aggression front Italians were quick to perceive that the TurcOoBritish declaration radicaııy altered the who le strategic position in the eastem Mediterranean. In Rome, Mussolini questioncd the British ambassador Sir Pcrcy Loraine: did Britain stiıı consider the AnglOoItalian arrangement of 16 April 1938 for the preservation of the status quo in the Mediterranean as valid? If so, how could it reconcile this arrangement with the latest policy of encirclement which Britain seemed to be foııowing. 104
By the patent desire in Turkey to link up with the anti-aggression front, Germany was profoundly disappointed. For years it had had, in the material field, a privilcged position in Turkey, and there was no question that it had been banking on a policy of neutrality in Ankara. The Berlin press, which had hoped that, by di nt of material circumslances, Turkey would be such an economic vassal of Germanyas at least to ensure neutrality in the event of war, was chagrined, lamenting that the Ankara govemment had placcd its pcople under the vassaIage of Britain. 105
The first German comment on the Turco-British declaration in the National Zeilung of 13 May stroke a menacing note:
Af ter years of a happy and healthy foreign policy, Turkey has abandoned the path of neutra1ity and, by the conclusion of a pact of mutual guarantee with Britain, has joined the British aggressive pact system directed against Gennany and lta1y. The Turkish govemment is playing the British game. They will not be in any doubt as to the consequences which Turkish participation in the policy of encirclement will naturally have for Turkey. Only recently Turkey gaye the Reich binding assurances on the observance of a policy of strict neutrality. With the Anglo-Turkish Pact, however, the Ankara govemment has left this path and made themselves vassals of a policy, the only aim of which could be collective war on beha1f of Britain. In view of the Berlin-Rome Axis and the gographical position of Turkey, it will be possible for Ankara itself to form an opinion as to whom this conclusion will affect the most. it should not, however, be imagined there that the limitation of this pact to the Mediterranean will leave a less negative impression in Berlin than -as is also contemplatedfull participation of Turkey in the British encirclement system. Britain and Turkey should note that Gennany and lta1y remain inseparable fihting companions in every case of the present and future, and against every combination. asserted, presupposed that its guardianship of the Dardaneııes would be exerciscd in the interests of all states. Now, the writer added, Turkey was no longer a neutral state, but was bo und to Britain in an open alliance, which envisaged the support of either partner for the other should one of them bccame involved in a Mediterrancan conflict. 'So Britaint, he continued, 'has obtained by roundaOOut ways its old objective, which evaded its efforts even during the Grcat War [...] the possibility of using all Turkish harbours and refuges, but aOOve all the Dardaneııes as a basc of opcrations, in any conflict affecting Britain -which in all circumstances must affect alsa the Mediterrancan in same way or other'. The writer proceeded to complain that the alliance was directed against Germany on the ground that the Reich would automaticaııy be involved in a Mediterranean war in which Italy was a participant. For the time being, he conceded, Turkey secmed to be careful aOOut taking over the Balkan obligations desired by Britain. Obviously, this indicated a certain reluctance to come into a conflict with the German Reich, which according to British propaganda, was the potential aggressor there. At the same time, it seemed to have been forgotten that immediately on the outbreak of a conflict in the Mediterranean, in which Italy stood on one side, every one must know that Germany would alsa be on that side.
Soon af ter the announcement of the Turco-British declaration, Von Papcn, the German ambassador in Ankara, was recaııed to Berlin to report to the Reich government. It was statcd that his visit to Germany, which would be short, was envisaged when the ambassador went to Ankara a month ago. In the hopc, presumably, that he would be able to exert same influence in the Turca-British and Turco-French negotiations, Von Papcn was sent off at such short notice that he had no time to pack tmnks, and he was now returning to make the necessary ammgements for a prolonged absence from Germany. The fact, however, that the Reich government had seen fit to announce that he was recallcd to report suggestcd an expressian of the annoyance undoubtedly felt with Turkey in offcial cireles in Berlin. 106
Since the Turco-British declaration was signcd, indeed, the strategic aspect of the Mediterranean was profoundly altered. And if the Russian adhesion to the anti-agrression front could be secured, the potentialities of the southeastern European and of the castem Mediterranean position would assume a new significance. The motives of the historic 1915 attempt to force the Dardaneııes had to be seen, and realised, in their fuıı pcrspective, and that at the outset of any conflicı The conclusion of the Turco-British agreement therefore led to a threatening posture on the part of the German government. The British were accused of luring the Turks into their policy of 'encirelement', and the Turks were wamcd to revoke this agrcement and not to l06papen, Memolrs, conclude any more like iL 107 The Axis relort to the Turco-British Declaration of 12 May was the Pact of Steel of 22 May. ıo8
The mutual assistance agreement arranged by Turkeyand Britain was warmly weIcomed in Moscow as an important link in the chain being forged to hold further encroachments by aggressive powers. The government newspaper lzvestia devoted its leading editorial on IS May to a favourablc comment, emphasising Turkey's strategical posilion and the close bond s of friendship belween Turkeyand the Soviet Union. The Turco-British declaration was greeted by lzvestia as 'one of th~links in thal chain which was the only sure means of preventing the extension of aggression to new parts of Europe. The people of the Soviet Union and aıı sincere partisans of pcace in aıı countries will value the conclusion by Turkey of the agreement wİlh Britain for mutual assistance as an invesıment in the cause of strengthening universal peace, which has always been most consistently defended by the Soviet Union.' lzvestia emphasised Turkey's wisdom in taking steps to defend itself against 'the predatory lusts of aggressive countries' and Russia's close friendship with Turkey. This friendship, said the newspaper, quoting the statement made by Saraçoğlu last autumn, did not represent an empty political fiction, but was a fact having origins in the most important events dating from when the new regimes were set up in Turkeyand the Soviet Union. Russian interest in the Balkan security was stated plainly. Threats to Balkan independence from 'certain imperialist states conceal a1so a threat to other countries which are vitally interesıed in the free use of the sea communications along the shores of the Balkan Peninsula, in the Medİlerranean and connecting the latler via the Straİls with ıhe Black Sea.'
The Balkan reception of the Turco-British declaration was, on the whole, unfavourable. The Romanians observed that, while they agreed with the idea, they considered so formal and bindig a declaration to be provocative. Yugoslavia's disagreement was more violenL On 10 May, Prince Paul, the Yugoslav Regent, arrived in Rome and over the next week, amidst the pomp and panoply of the five-day state visit, explored wiıh Ciano the possibilities of forming aBaıkan bloc excluding Turkey, aligned with the Axis. The ıtalian argument were that Turkey, in signing the declaration wiıh Britain, was acting on its own in amatler conceming the wholc of Balkans. The lta1ians considered that Turkey had disturbed the current Medilerranean status and disregarded the interests of Yugoslavia. Turkey's sin could be atoned only 107M•A•E., T 1930 -1940 On the other hand, in Belgrade, reports that Yugoslavia had made a protest in connection with the Turco-British declaration were authoritatively denied. Diplomatic inquiries only were being made in a friendly manner as to the extent of the agreement and its possible repercussions on the Balkan Entente and on the existing mutual obligations of members of the Entente. The newspaper Politika, in an inspired artiele on 14 May, stated that Turkey had changed suddenly its attitude, which had been the stance of its Balkan allies, and that it adhered now ıo a bloc of powers under the infiuence of event, which in Turkish opinion had endangered security in the Mediterranean. The Turkish Premier (said the journal) deelared that the position of Turkey within the Balkan Entente remained unchanged. But it was certain that the centre of gravity of Turkish interests was being transferred all the same to the Mediterranean. The writer in the end asked: was it because thesc Metirerrancan interests were so great or so endangered that in future all Turkish actions should be determined by those interests alone?
That Yugoslavia, of all countries, should now complain of Turkey's action towards Britain came oddly from a government which in the last few years had been 'swinging loosc', consulting at all times (as any govemment ought to do) what it considered its own best interests. The Balkan Entente was no more harmed by the Turco-British deelaration than it was by Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact and Yugoslav-ltalian understanding. The integrity of the Balkans was in fact one of the main aims of Turkish diplomacy, and it was hard ıo understand that in the resolute pursuit of this Turkey should have ıo suffer criticsm by its friends. The Turco-British and Turco-French declarations represented for all ıhree parlies lhe sıarıing point for negotiations inlended lO culminaıe ultimately in a formal tripartiıe pact of mutual assistance. The intervening period was to be covered by an interim agreement, discussion for which began (and proceeded pari passu with talks about lhe tripartite pact) immediately the decIaration was announced in Ankara, London and Paris. But, whereas lhe decIaraıion had been agreed upon in a surprisingly shorı time, ıhe ensuing negotiations were allowed lO drag on for more that five monıhs, during which lhe political circumstances altered appreciably. The Wesıern powers contribuled to the delay by insisting on a precise Turkish commiunent LO the guaranteed countries, Greece and Romania, while Turkey, on ils parı, continued lo postpone action until it had rcceived substantial Westem military and financial aid. During this period, lhe political factors which had originally Icd Turkey to seck an alIiance with the West -Italy's bcııicosity and Russia's friendship-changed so radicaııy thaı the bcginning of hostilities found Italy neutral and the Soviet Union Germany's collaborator. 111 These developmenls were not foreseen in May when the two sides firsı defined their aims in preparation for the interim agreement Turkey's attitude was that according to the stipulations of the Balkan Enıente, it was under an obligation to help Greece if that counlry were attacked by Bulgaria or by a third power (ltaly excluded at Greece's request) acting in concert with Bulgaria; and also to help if Greece were involved in hostilities in the eastem Mediterranean which brought into play the British guarantcc and the TurcoBritish decIaration. LLS attitude towards Romania was a great deal more cautious. Saraçoğlu could foresee three eventualities: first, an Italo-German attack extending to the Balkans; secondly, the unlikely but possible neutraIity of one Axis partner while the other attacked in the Balkans; and lastly, agreession against Romania by a power other than ltaly or Germany. In the last instance, unlcss the aggressor was Bulgaria, in which case the provisions of the Balkan Entente came into effect, Turkey was not disposed to he Ip Romania, particularly not against Russian attaek. In the first two eventualities, Saraçoğlu stated that there existed no legaI obligation to help Romania and that Turkey did not wish to assume such a responsibility unless ils security was directly threatened. 112 London found this anitude little short of disingenuous. In British eyes, the point of helping Turkey in the eastem Mediterranean was to secure Turkish help in implementing the guarantee to Romania. [VOL. XXVII acceptable formula to cover Romania combined with the simultaneous presence of a Russian project touching the Black Sea, had pcrsuaded Britain to concentrate on the castem Mediterranean. When the Russian project fcll, the clause conceming the Balkans had been inserted at the last moment as a pledge of the two parties' concem with Romania. One e the declaration had been issued, translating this cIause into an effective and specific Turco-British guarantee to Romania bccame once again the core of the negotiations.l 13
As London saw it, the only juridically foolprof method of ensuring Turkish help for Romania was for Turkey to be a belligerent. Britain therefore looked for a formula which would have placed Turkey at war, even nominally, at the same time that Britain became involved in hostilities as a result of impIementing the guarantce. The point, of course, was to obtain passage through the Straits. With this aim in mind London, on June 4, proposed a draft agrrement, by which Turkey was to give Greece and Romania an undertaking of all aid and assistance tantamount to a promise of belligerence whenever the Westem pledges came into operation -in effect, a guarantce. In the British view, a direct Turkish guarantee to Greece involved no further obligation than Turkey had alrcady assumed in the declaration, and the crucial factor in introducing this provision in the draft was to facilitate the introduction of the much more essential similar clause about Romania. 114 The other portions of the British draft granted the Turkish reservation about a Russian attack on Romania, both because it was a sine qua non of Turkish policyand because Britain's interest in Romania extended to its independence, not its territoriaI integrity. Turkey's qualms about a possible ıtalian neutrality, in which case there would presumably be no war in the Meditteranean, were discounted by the British Foreign Office on the grounds that the signature of the Pact of Steel had greatly diminished that possibility. The crucial point Was Turkey's unwillingness to assume commitments in the Balkans unless its security was directly thrcatened and here London produced the counter argument that any attack on Romania presented a real threat to Turkey. Therefore, Halifax concluded that it was best to provide for that threat by joining in the Westem guarantee to Romania, thus creating a climate of opinion which would not only stiffen the Romanians' will to resist but also contribute to deter an eventual aggressor. 115 It was significant that the fırst question raised by Saraçoğlu on June 4, when handed these British proposals concemed the delay in presenting a
The Turks estimated their needs much higher. They recalled it had been agreed since the beginning of Lhe negotiations that Turkey's cooperation in Lhe containment front would only be possible with substanıial military and financial support. On 14 July, Lhey put forLh a comprehensive Essentially, what Lhe Turks wanted in the economic and financial fields were loans and credits to buy armaments, alternative markets for their staple products and alternatiye sources of supply in Lhe event of Germany cutting off trade altogether. While LheWestern powers were quite aware Lhat failure to satisfy Lhese requirements might impcril Turkey's adherence to Lhe containment front, Lhey were also quite determined to make all financial arragements depcnd on the conclusion of a satisfactory political agrecment raıher than the oLher way round, as seemed to be Turkey's intention. London, at the end of June, was prepared to grant Turkey furLher credits of ten million pounds (in addition to a sixteen million pounds credit arrangcd in i938) as well as to offer delivery wiıhin twelve months of war matcrials valued at six million pounds. Buı Lhere were serious limits, caused by its own armament pro!,'Tamme, and Lhedrain on its hard-currency reserves, beyond which Britain could not go. London, for example, reckoned it could supply littıc more than one-tenth of Lherequirements estimated by Ankara. An additional sum of five million pounds had been budgeted for credits to Turkey, but was kept as a reserve and not mentioned at Lhis stage. Regarding alternatiye markets, Britain protested that it could not absorb any more raw products and suggested Turkey to try the Russians. FinaIly, a cash loan was thought to be out of the question owing to Britain's exchange position; KnatchbullHugessen was instructed to avoid discussing Lhistopic.120 plan which included thirtyfive million pounds credit for a rearmament programme (including reorganising the Turkish arrnaments industry and plaeing orders in the United States, Belgium and Sweden), a bullion loan of fifteen million pounds to support the Turkish currency and a further credit of ten million pounds for urgent arrnaments purehases, and to free all frozen balances before devaluing the Turkish lira and plaeing all trade on a compensaLİon basis. Turkey also insisted on meeting the service of the fifteen million pounds with de!İveries of tobacco. it urged Britain and France to get together to see how best they could meet these requirements and in what proportion. 121
The French reacLİon to this last suggestion was that since they had already made a substantial saerifice with the return of Hatay, they ought to be dispensed from giying Turkey further economic assistance. 122 The argument was, of course, entirely unconvincing since Hatay was not French territory, and the return did not involve any financial saerificc. London's attitude was that the Turks had overestimated their needs, but that they sohuld be met for poliLİcal reasons. 123 As it finally turned out, by the time the Turco-AngloFrench treaty was signed on 19 October, Turkey had been granted the larger share of thesc demands and had also succeeded in reversing the British condition that financial assistance should follow the political agreemenı
In the political negoLİations, the Western powers were in an equally unenviable bargaining position. They needed Turkey, which they had cast as the linchpin of the containment front in the Balkans, more than Turkey needed them for, in the last analysis, Turkey could always opt for neutrality, Agreement in principle on the draft treaty was reached on September 1, and at the same time Turkeyobtained from Britain aten million pounds eredit for arms purchases and a three million bullion pounds loan later increased LOfive million pounds with no interest in the first year. On the poliLİcal provisions, Britain and France not only gaye way on their request for reciprocity but also guaranteed Turkey unilaterally against a European power, understood to be either Bulgaria or Germany.l24
In the summer months of 1939, Britain and France soughtto establish a common front with the Soviet Union, in view of the German threats to world peace. Turkey followed these developments with close concern and The general policy of Turkey was restated succinctly by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in ıstanbul daily Yeni Sabah of 5 October:
When, as a consequence of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the German expansionist C1aims and the destruction of Albania, Turkey was awakened to the danger of an attack on the Balkans, it associated itself with the peace front. it did its best to include its close friend the Soviet Union into this association. 
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Turkey, however, continued to search for the illusive Soviet conneetion to paralıcı its accommodation with Britain and France. Thus on September 25, Saraçoğlu left for Moscow for the purpose of concluding a new agrecment with the Soviet Union. Conversations towards such an agrecment had becn going on for some time between the Soviet ambassador at Ankara and the Turkish govemmenl. Turkey desired an agreement that would rcaffirm Soviet support of the status quo in the Black Sca region and by the same token confirm Soviet respeet of Turkish indepcndence and territorial integrity, which could c1car the way for a proposed Turkish allance with Britain and France. Soviet objeetives were quite differenl. Having moved closer to Germany, it now resented the prospect of a Turco-Anglo-French aıliance. To keep Turkey away from cooperating with the West was at that time one of the major objcctives of German foreign policy. 126 attention, interested as it was in the strengthening of the pcace fronl. The conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact of 23 August 1939 gave Turkish leaders a severe shock. The Turks, Massigli informed Paris. reacted to it with a 'sentiment near to stupor and lost themselves in conjectures, most often pessimistic, on the motives that had inspircd Joseph Stalin's dccision'. Their disappointment was keen when they leamed that their formidable Soviet neighbour, hitherto friendly and since 1934 openly espousing the status quo and collective sccurity, had joined hands with the Nazi proponents of armcd revision. it meant, moreover, that their friendship with Britain and France, instcad of being approved, would now be criticised in Moscow. 125 Germany needed the aid of the Soviet Union, who as a c10se and powerful neighbour was in a much stronger position to press for a change in Turkish policy. Both to appcase Germany and to keep the conflict away from its borders, the Soviet Union desired Turkish neutrality. Thus considering the basic divergence in objcctives, it was no wonder that Saraçoğlu's mission to Moscow failed. 127 understanding with the democracies into a long-term pact, it kept its friend Russia informed of an the stages of the se negotiations. In this matter Turkey received from the Soviet Union nothing but friendly expressions of satisfaction and approval. Turkey considers its relations with its neighbour, the Soviet Union, to be as important as its relations with the democracies. it definitely does not wish to make a choice between its friends in the East and in the West, or to take up a position hostile to either. Consequently it is impossible that the basis of our a1liance with the Westem democracies should give offence to Russia, or that we should abandon the basis of that alliance. In the event of war for any reason between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union, Turkey can do its Eastem and Westem friends no better service than by maintaining a sinceree neutrality.
By that time Turco-Anglo-French discussions for a definitive alliance were far advanced and most of the major points of the agreement setLled. In order to reconcile its Westem friendship with Soviet objections, Turkey was wiIling to formuIate its proposcd aIIiance with Britain and France in such a way that it would explicitly exclude any common anti-Soviet action. this concession was made with the approval of the British and the French, who fully understood Turkey's difficult position. On October 19, two days af ter Saraçoğlu's return to Ankara, the Turco-Anglo-French treaty was signed. Protocol No. 2 absolved Turkey from any action caIculated to bring it into connict with the Soviet Union. Otherwise, Turkeyand the two Westem powers mutuaııy undertook to lend one another aıı assistance in their power, whether a war arising out of the Anglo-French guarantees to Greece and Romania or a European act of aggression against Turkey.
A special secret agreement stipulated a credit to Turkey of twenty-five milIion pounds for the purchase of war materials; the immediate delivery of orders already placed against this credit; the creation of a commission to decide what further materials Turkey nccded to resist aggression; a loan of fifteen milIion pounds in gold, interest and capital repayable in Turkish Liras which, however, had to be uscd to purchase Turkish commodities. Article 6 of the spccial secre't agreeement laid dow n that Turkey was not obligcd to fulfil the obligations of the political trcaty until af ter it had received delivery on aıı the outstanding war materials on order as weII as the neworders to be decided by the commission and the gold loan. The tripartite treaty also included a wide-ranging military convention covering a number of hypotheses to be discussed, problems of troop transport and aIIied based on Turrkish territory including the Sea of Marmara but not, owing to the Russian clause, the Black Sea. Lastly to prove that the Russian clause would not be used as an excuse for Turkey's withdrawal if the Soviet Union intervened in a conflict aıready under way, the Turks inserted a provision forbidding a separate peace or armistice. 128 128The text of the treaty is in League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. CC, pp. 167-175; the secret protoco1s are outlined in Massigli, La Turqule devant la Guerre, 292-295. There can in history be few more vivid examples of the tuming of enemies into friends than that provided by Turkeyand Britain. During the Great War, the Otloman Empire and the British Empire were at grips in a life-and-death struggle. The bittemess of that strife survived the armistice, and for the Turkish nationalist sentiment arising on the ruins of the Otlarnan Empire, the British officiaııy had no sympathy. The Treaty of Lausanne succeeded the Treaty of Sevres; and still the Turks felt that Britain was their chief enemy. As Turkey grew more confident in its own strength, it alsa grew less suspicious of British motives towards iL It was notably af ter the emergence of the ıtalian menace in the eastem Mediterranean in the mid1930s that an atmosphere was created in which both the Turkish and British govemments could work for a new understanding. The difficulties had been considerable, but goodwiıı on either side had surmounted them, and the Treaty of Mutual Assistance that came up was a vindication of the vision and patience of both Ankara and London.
